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Abstract  
This paper aims to expose the common law directors’ duties of care and skill encapsulated 
under the South African commercial law. Thereafter an in depth analysis of the newly 
introduced statutory duty of care, skill and diligence contained in section 76(3)(c) of the 
South African Companies Act 2008, which replaced the Companies Act 61 of 1973. Lastly 
the focus will shift to the origin and application of the business judgment rule which was 
previously unknown to our legislature and freshly introduced under the provisions of section 
76(4) of the Companies Act 2008. A historic overview will commence in introducing the 
common law duties of care and skill, there after moving to the judiciaries in which South 
Africa followed in moulding the partial codification of directors duties of care, skill and 
diligence encompassed in the Companies Act 2008. An evaluation to the newly hybrid 
stringent test adopted in our statute as opposed to the common law lenient view shall also be 
exposed. The forth chapter will focus on the “safe-harbour” which is provided for in the 
business judgment rule which focuses on more than just shielding directors who act in good 
faith with the requisites encompassed under the provisions of section 76. A synopsis will also 
be carried out to the American based business judgment rule which our South African law 
has adopted as well as the critique and reviewing factors of the South African modelled 
business judgment rule. After outlining the crux of each chapter a condensed summary into 
the topic at hand will be explained. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.1 THE TITLE 
“A focus on directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence in terms of the common law and the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008.” 
1.2 THE TOPIC 
The topic which will be researched and exposed orbits around an overview of the duties of a 
director, namely that of care, skill and diligence in terms of the common law and statute with 
particular reference to the Companies Act 71 of 2008. An exposition of the newly introduced 
business judgment rule formulated under the provisions of section 76(4) shall also be 
focussed on, observing the requisites necessary in order for a director who acts in good faith 
to be afforded the protection of the rule. 
1.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
The research methodology for this dissertation is desk-based and the information in respect of 
directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence as well as the business judgment rule will be 
distilled from case law, statutes, journal articles, textbooks and numerous internet data bases 
such as: Juta; Lexis Nexis; Hein online; SAFLII; Sabinet and Butterworths Company Law 
Cases (BCLC). 
A qualitative approach will be administered in this research to entail exploring the crux of the 
common law and statutory law duties of care, skill and diligence together with the 
consequences of failing to carrying out such duties.  A topic ancillary to the duties of care, 
skill and diligence, namely that of the business judgment rule will also be explored. 
Particular reference shall be made to the South African Commercial law; particularly the 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the common law. In citing the Companies Act 2008, priority 
will be attached to the directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence as well as the business 
judgment rule, its critiques and pros and cons. 
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1.4 SCOPE OF THE DISSERTATION 
1.4.1 This dissertation addresses the South African Commercial Law with reference to the 
duty of care, skill and diligence in both, common law and statute, the arguments for and 
against its codification and lastly the business judgment rule with an overview of the 
jurisdiction that our law followed in enacting the business judgment rule into the Companies 
Act 71 of 2008. 
1.4.2 Even though the courts still have regard to the common law including ascending year’s 
case law regarding directors’ duties of care and skill, there are recommendations and changes 
to the current legislation which will be focussed at including the criticisms which arise as a 
result of the partial codification of directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence encompassed 
in the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
1.4.3 The general principle is that directors are liable for damages which emanate from their 
negligence in the performance of their duties of care and skill. As a consequence of being in 
the position as director the directors have a duty to exercise and perform such duties with 
care, skill and diligence, ultimately for the best interest of the company. The South African 
judiciary has adopted a very benevolent attitude towards directors’ duties of care, skill and 
diligence which has moved from the more lenient traditional approach which existed in the 
common law to a more stringent approach of the statutory law. Both these approaches shall 
be addressed in this dissertation.   
1.4.4 A controversial issue, which South Africa adopted from the American judiciary, namely 
the business judgement rule will be investigated. The main focus is whether it would be 
necessary or desirable that directors do not incur personal liability for mistakes or errors 
which led the company to suffer losses and damages as a result of their disastrous decisions 
despite acting in good faith. The reasoning for South Africa adopting the rule as well as the 
extensive criticisms which has tagged along with the rule shall also be discussed. 
1.4.5 A conclusion following the above enquiries will be discussed in the last Chapter. 
1.5. INTRODUCTION  
The concept of duties of a director does not only represent something being learnt such as 
academics or achieving a degree, but rather has to be looked at with its focus on the ever 
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changing commercial landscape present in South Africa1. There are many problems which 
exist and arise when a director is appointed to such a post and the main issue which seems 
consistent throughout the years is that a director tends to act for their own selfish benefit or 
interests which consequently impacts negatively on the company and its eventual downfall. 
It is obvious that a company cannot operate or function without human involvement and as 
such directors are appointed who use their diverse skills and strategies to execute and act on 
behalf of a company and in such performance should act in and uphold the best interests of 
the company2. 
Most of South Africa’s company directors do not know what an appointment of a director 
actually entails and this area of law is currently in a very steep and slow development 
phase3.The reason why I chose this topic is to not only provide the reader with information to 
the duties of care and skill of a director but to also expand my knowledge and understanding 
to this subject as there are many aspects in this area with potholes which I intend on filling. 
Most people are not aware of what is expected of a director and if such duties are not carried 
out the consequences which result from their negligence or mala fide (bad faith) conduct 
could be disastrous to the company, society and most importantly the employees of the 
company.  
I am of the opinion director’s often overlook the liability which may result from their 
negligence, usually from misunderstanding a company’s limited liability which clouds a 
directors’ mind into thinking that he would be exempt from liability despite being blissfully 
ignorant to the decisions made for and on behalf of the company. In the past directors had no 
direction as to what their duties and performance to the company entailed. Recently the 
partial codification introduced in the 2008 Companies Act resolves this issue by making the 
law much clearer and somewhat guideline approach to help directors perform optimally for 
the success and profitability of the company4. 
In this dissertation I intend on providing an in depth exposition on the duties of a director 
particularly to their care, skill and diligence which will be rooted from the common law 
perspective making its way to the statutory findings in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 
                                                          
1
 FHI Cassim et al.Contemporary Company Law. 2ed. (2012) 555 
2
 Ibid  
3
 V Finch. ‘Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care’? (1992) 55 Modern LR 179 at 179. 
4
 See note 1 above. 
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2008. An analysis on the protection afforded to a director from liability from mere errors and 
mistakes taken in good faith shall also be discussed with a detailed discussion on the business 
judgment rule, its origin and application. 
1.5.1 The common law 
 There are many sources from which the duties of a director are extracted, however prior to 
the Companies Act 71 of 2008 the rights and duties of directors were rooted and sourced 
from the agreements which  were concluded with the company, the company’s memorandum 
and articles of association, the former Companies Act 63 of 1971 and the common law.5 
As in other jurisdictions, it is trite and noteworthy that directors who breach their common 
law duties and obligations to act with the expected standard of care and skill may be liable for 
damages and incur delictual liability.6 At common law the courts exercised judicial restraint 
when they assessed the directors’ powers and functions in running the company.7 South 
African law regarding directors’ duties of care and skill has been heavily influenced by 
English law and as such South African law has initially adopted a lenient attitude towards 
directors’ duties of care and skill.8 
The common law is a point of retreat when it comes to an analysis of directors’ duties. It is 
apparent that the provisions or principles set down in the common law are subject to change 
as a result of current sources such as statutes and case law which will consequently impact of 
the traditional common law approach9. Traditionally both the duties to act with honesty and 
with care and skill were not seen as sui generis (unique) duties of directors, and as such the 
partially codified Companies Act 71 of 2008 addresses the uniqueness of the fiduciary and 
non-fiduciary duties of directors10. 
Historically the common law made little demands on directors to exercise care and skill, and 
the directors were at liberty to manage the companies with disregard, incompetent conduct 
and with no demand to ensure that such duties were carried out with the reasonable efficiency 
                                                          
5
 Natasha Bouwman “An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill” SA Mercantile 
law journal 21 (2009) 509   
6
 Ibid at 509 
7
 See note 3 above 
8
 JJ, Du Plessis “A comparative analysis of directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence in South Africa and in 
Australia” (2010) Acta Juridica 236. 
9
 See note 5 above 
10
 Ibid at 509 
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and expected care and skill.11 At common law all that was expected of a director in the midst 
and performance of carrying out his office was to exercise care and skill in a manner similar 
to a director with his or her knowledge, skill and experience, having no regard to any other 
factors.12 
The common law plays a crucial role in the governance of directors’ duties and 
responsibilities as directors act as agents for the company in carrying out their obligations 
which ultimately should be in furthering the best interests of the company. Directors’ duties 
are disparate and inexhaustible and as a result of this the provisions of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008, aim to accommodate and transform the expectation of directors’ duties with the ever 
changing commercial terrain. 
1.5.2 The statutory provisions relating to the duty of care, skill and diligence- Section 
76(3)(c). 
The universal principle which exists in the performance of directors’ duties of care and skill 
is that directors are liable for the damages and losses which emanate from their negligence in 
the performance of their duties.13  A good example of this principle is expressed in the 
Australian case of Daniels v Anderson14, which has had a considerable influence on South 
African law. The court held that the modern law of negligence should be used to ascertain 
whether a director was in breach of his or her fiduciary duties. The court further held that the 
use of a more objective approach to the director’s duties to exercise care and skill should be 
founded15. This case conveys a change in the attitude of the South African judiciary in 
attaining an abrupt end to the perception that directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence 
should be assessed solely subjectively.16 
It is critical that directors exercise their duties with care and skill and as such the concepts of 
“care” and “skill” are to be differentiated. “Skill” is described as the technical area or 
competence of a director, whereas “care” describes the manner in which the skill is applied17. 
                                                          
11
 M Bekink “A Historical Overview of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill: From the Nineteenth Century to the 
Companies Bill of 2007” (2008) 20 Merc LJ 95-97. 
12
 FHI Cassim et al.Contemporary Company Law. 2ed. (2012) 555. 
13
 Cassim, 505; [1989] BCLC 498 (Ch) 
14
  ACSR 607 CA (NSW) at 664-665. 
15
Ibid 
16
 ibid 
17
 See note 13 above 
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Skill differs from person to person but care is assessed objectively18. A point of importance 
which carries irony is that a director’s incompetence can actually protect him or her from 
liability19. The degree of care, skill and diligence depend mainly on the experience and skill 
set of that particular director. The lower the skill set or the less experience a director has, the 
lower the standard of care which will be expected from the director20. 
An example which elucidates the above is expressed as follows: - “Tim is appointed as a 
director of a company, if for any particular reason Tim does not possess the expected 
experience, skill or business acumen, the subjective test will subsequently be applied. If Tim 
is capable of only conducting a sub standard amount of skill and expertise while being in a 
position as a director of company, then it is only that substandard or low amount of skill and 
care that is attached to Tim in holding him liable for breach of his duty of care and skill21”. 
As illustrated above if the director lacks the relevant business acumen and is unskilled then a 
low standard of care and skill will be expected of him or her. As a result of this if the director 
possesses a low skill set and business acumen such a director will consequently be protected 
from liability as a result of his or her substandard performance in holding the position as 
director22.  
The Companies Act 71 of 200823 reconstructs and modernises the directors’ duties of care 
and skill, as it imposes a less subjective and more demanding and rigorous standard for 
directors than that of the common law. The provisions of statute accommodates for a hybrid 
standard containing both subjective and objective elements while its initiation to statute 
reflect the modern commercial concerns, attitude and principles in incorporating successful 
management of companies as well as introducing the importance of corporate governance.24  
The Act has partially codified the directors’ duty to exercise care, skill and diligence and as 
such embraces both objective and subjective elements25. As part of the partial codification a 
                                                          
18
 Cilliers, Benade et al Korporatiewe reg Tweede uitgawe (1992) 142.  
19
 FHI Cassim “Fraudulent or reckless trading and s 424 of the Companies Act of 1973” (1981) 98 SALJ 162. 
20
 Ibid  
21
 See note 6 above. 
22
 ibid 
23
 Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
24
 FHI Cassim et al. Contemporary Company Law.2ed (2012) 558. 
25
 McLennan. “Duties of Care and Skill of Company Directors and their Liability for Negligence” (1996) 8 SA 
Merc LJ 101. 
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two legged test has been introduced in section 76(3)(c) of the 2008 Act26. The first leg is 
contained in subsection (i) which is  has an objective meaning, conveying the notion that all 
directors should meet a threshold to avoid liability while subsection (ii) comprises of a 
subjective test which requires quantifying the experience, skill, care and business acumen of 
that particular director27. 
 The purpose of the partial codification is ultimately to provide clarity and clearer guidelines 
for directors when it comes to director’s liability with regard to a breach of his or her 
fiduciary duty and the duty of care, skill and diligence28. It further focuses on couching 
directors’ ignorance, addressing the scope of their duties and as such making it more 
accessible and removing the vagueness which existed while making the law more 
accessible29. 
1.5.3. The business judgment rule. 
The business judgment rule has been introduced into the Companies Act to try and soften the 
duty of care, skill and diligence which was codified by the Companies Act 71 of 200830. 
Section 76(4) is the relevant section which has introduced the business judgment rule into 
South African law. The business judgment rule has followed the developments made in the 
American terrain. The provision of the rule entails the discretion which is to be used by 
courts in holding directors accountable for business decisions which produced poor results.31 
Such restraint is cautioned by a director making a decision in a bona fide manner (good 
faith), with care and on an informed basis. Subject to a director conducting himself or herself 
in good faith without any foolish disregard seen as negligence, the provisions of the rule shall 
apply. The elements of the business judgment rule in the American context are voiced as 
follows: “a business decision; disinterestedness; due care; good faith; and no abuse of 
discretion or waste of corporation assets.” 32  The purpose of the rule ultimately is to 
encourage risk taking; persuading competent persons to undertake the office of the director, 
                                                          
26
 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 
27
 Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing1989 BCLC 498  
28
 Irene‐Marie Esser and Johan Coetzee 2004 (12) Juta Business Law Journal 26 
29
 FHI Cassim.et al Contemporary Company Law.2ed. (2012) 462 
30
 FHI Cassim.et al Contemporary Company Law.2ed. (2012) 563 
31
 S Kennedy-Good “The Business Judgment Rule (Part 1)” (2006) Obiter 62-64. 
32
D Botha and R Jooste “A Critique of the Recommendations in the King Report Regarding a Director’s Duty of 
Care and Skill” (1997) SALJ 65-73 
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the prevention of judicial review; avoiding shareholders involvement in the management of 
the company; and placing mechanisms in place to manage the director’s behaviour33. 
The business judgment rule affords directors with a defence in respect of the business 
decisions made by them which are challenged by shareholders, stakeholders and interested 
parties through litigative processes who state that the directors have acted without the due 
standard of care and skill with complete disregard and incompetence 34 . The business 
judgment rule has become a controversial issue which has experienced vast critique. The 
issue addressed by many commentators is whether it would be necessary or desirable to 
introduce the business judgment rule into our law in order to protect directors who in good 
faith from incurring personal liability for the losses which the company incurred as a result of 
their business decisions35. Further a point of critique is whether it was wise for South Africa 
to follow a judiciary such as America considering the view that the two laws are completely 
different from each other36. 
The business judgment rule is a tool in judicial review and the rule essentially serves as a 
“safe harbour” from liability in cases where a director has made an informed decision, in 
good faith and on a rational and reasonable basis37.  A director will therefore not be liable if 
he or she acted with due care and diligence in making a decision even if the business decision 
led to unfortunate results. For the business judgment rule to be applicable, a requirement is 
that the director must not have acted in their selfish interests, must have made an informed 
decision in an informed manner and must have rationally believed that their decision was in 
the best interests of the company38. 
According to Havenga39, the business judgment rule was developed “because of a desire to 
protect honest directors and officers from the risks inherent in hindsight review of their 
unsuccessful decisions, and because of a desire to refrain from stifling innovation and 
venturesome business activity”.40 
                                                          
33
 Lee (2003) Columbia Law Review 945. 
34
 Matsimela (2011) Company Law Hub Journal of Student Research Vol 1 Article 5 
35
 Kennedy-Good (2006) Obiter 63. 
36
 Ibid  
37
 See note 33 above. 
38
 Ibid at 939 
39
 Havenga (2000) SA Merc LJ 28; American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: 
Restatement and Recommendations (1982). 
40
 Ibid  
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Chapter 4 below dealing with the business judgment rule will seek to address the purpose of 
the business judgment rule, its relationship with the duty of care, skill and diligence, its 
origin, application and the statutory codification that exists in South African law and the 
criticisms which has been a controversial issue amongst commentators. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
CHAPTER 2 
GENERAL AND THE COMMON LAW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Companies appoint directors to carry out the day to day dealings and functions required of a 
company. A company director apart from owing the company a fiduciary duty also owes the 
company a duty to act with care and skill41. Prior to the 2008 Act, the duties of directors’ 
were derived from many sources such as the agreements concluded by companies, companies 
memorandum and articles of association,  the preceding Companies Act 61 of 1973 and most 
importantly the common law42. 
The common law is a point of departure when it comes to analysing the duties of a director 
with particular reference the duties of care, skill and diligence which was rooted and heavily 
influenced by English precedent from the late 18th and early 19th century where the 
foundations of such duties were laid down43. An exposition into the traditional principles of 
the common law is paramount in gaining a proper understanding of the statutory provisions 
of the Act, particularly to the non–fiduciary duties of care, skill and diligence44. 
A principle followed by innumerable English precedents which has been accepted in the early 
centuries couches the view that directors are not liable for a breach of their duty of care, skill 
and diligence if they merely acted negligently45. An extract from the case of Lagunas Nitrate 
Company v Lagunas Syndicate 46   makes particular reference to this principle of negligence 
and held that the amount of care to be taken is difficult to pin point; but it is noteworthy that 
directors are not liable for all the mistakes which they make, however if they had taken more 
care and precaution in carrying out their duties there is a possibility that the directors might 
have avoided such errors and mistakes which reasonably could have been avoided47. 
                                                          
41
 Kanamugire and Chimuka, 2014 “The Directors’ Duty to Exercise Care and Skill in Contemporary South African 
Company Law and the Business Judgment Rule” Vol 5 no 20, pg 1 
42
 Natasha Bouwman “An Appraisal of the Modification of the Director’s Duty of Care and Skill” SA Mercantile 
law journal 21 (2009) 509. 
43
 J. Du Plessis “A comparative analysis of directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence in South Africa and in 
Australia: Corporate governance, mergers and takeovers: Part II.” (2010) Acta Judica 263. 
44
 M F Cassim “Contemporary Company Law” 2ed. (2012) 554 
45
J Du Plessis “A Comparative Analysis of Directors’ Duty of Care, Skill and Diligence in South Africa and in 
Australia” 2010 at 5 
46
 [1899] 2 Ch 392. 
47
 Ibid  
13 
 
Despite the common law evolving and advancing in accordance with various commentaries 
and authoritative sources, there is still an issue which at hand, not only in South Africa but in 
many other jurisdictions and such issue is the practical difficulties in endorsing an 
appropriate and acceptable standard of care and skill expected of the directors of a 
company48. As a consequence of this uncertainty a “dark cloud” is in existence as to the 
extent, degree or standard to which a director should exercise their powers and duties in 
conducting the affairs and holding office in a company49. 
The issue which hovers as the ardous “dark cloud” is that a director is obliged to act with the 
required and expected degree and standard of care, skill and diligence but to what extent is a 
director expected to carry out such duties. Further the content of the appropriate standard 
required and how such standard is to be measured is a controversial issue and remains an 
unclear one which dampens our law 50 . In the past the courts adopted the view that 
shareholders or stakeholders were responsible for the appointment of directors who made the 
decisions on behalf of the company without the proper care and skill. Such responsibility 
rooted from the fact that the shareholders had appointed the directors to such a position by 
their vote or choice, and if a foolish and incompetent director was appointed the shareholders 
was ultimately to blame51. 
Traditionally the common law duties of a director were divided into two, firstly being the 
duty to act in good faith, honesty and loyalty, commonly known as the fiduciary duties and 
secondly the duty to act with care, skill and diligence known as the non-fiduciary duties52. It 
is of significance to note and distinguish these two duties as the fiduciary duties are sui 
generis (unique) in nature while the non-fiduciary duties link to delictual or acquilian 
liability53. 
As stated above directors’ duties are diverse, constantly evolving with the economic 
landscape which is prevalent in South Africa. The Companies Act 71 of 2008 sets a more 
demanding and taxing standard which has tightened and upgraded the common law 
                                                          
48
 See note 33 at 555 
49
 See note 34: Du Plesis at 263. 
50
 See note 31 at 501 
51
 See note 33 at 555 
52
 Du Plessis v Phelps 1995 (4) SA 165 (C). 
53
See note 33 at 555  
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provisions which expected a degree of skill and care from directors traditionally which was of 
an exceptionally low standard54. 
2.2 THE STANDARD OF CARE AND SKILL TO BE EXERCISED BY A DIRECTOR OF 
A COMPANY    IN TERMS OF THE COMMON LAW: 
2.2.1. Quantifying the appropriate standard of care and skill in terms of the common law 
The common law remains very much alive in the statutory provisions of director’s duties of 
care and skill; however its relevance, application and use has departed and evolved from the 
common law approach due to the constant change in the commercial environment existent in 
South Africa. It is important to set out and understand the traditional common law approach 
which was adopted in South Africa, and as such will be explained in this chapter. 
It is paramount that directors manage the affairs and decisions of a company as a reasonable 
prudent person would manage their own affairs55.  The courts did not enforce the duty of care 
in the same manner in which the fiduciary duties were strenuously enforced56.  It is important 
to note that the common law’s relaxed approach was originally rooted from two principles.57 
The first principle was that shareholders were ultimately liable for and responsible for the 
competence of the persons appointed by them to manage the affairs of the company, and 
secondly; early directors were mostly appointed for the sake of title and reputation and did 
not possess any particular skill or business acumen which would be beneficial to the 
company58. The repercussions of a director failing to act with the expected standard of care 
and skill are linked to the law of delict and negligence59. It must be recognised that even 
though South African law followed the same steps as in English precedent, a distinction 
exists which is quite apparent. In South African law, fault and wrongfulness are distinct 
concepts and both must be present to hold a director accountable for negligent conduct in 
delict, this was illustrated in the case of Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & 
                                                          
54
 See note 49 above 
55
 MM Botha “The role and duties of directors in promotion of Corporate  Governance :A South African 
perspective”(2009) 3 Obiter 702 at 706 
56
 FHI Cassim ‘Fraudulent or Reckless trading and s.424 of the Companies Act of 1973’ (1981) 98 SALJ 162. 
57 Havenga (2000) SA Merc LJ 28; American Law Institute Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure: 
Restatement and Recommendations (1982) at 26-27. 
58
 Ibid at 26 to 27 
59
 Ex Parte Lebowa Developments Corporation Ltd 1989 (3) SA 71 (T); 
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Templar60. The South African taking is very distinct from English law, as wrongfulness is not 
a clearly defined requirement that must be present for liability of a director. 
Authorities such as Cilliers and Benade are of the opinion that the standards according to 
which the degree of care and skill are to be quantified are by no means clear61 and the 
reasoning behind this statement is that while it is to a certain extent possible to establish 
“care” objectively, “skill” varies from person to person. A remarkable analogy to this point is 
clearly expressed by these authors who state the following; “It is not a requirement that the 
directors of a steel company be accomplished metallurgists; people of other professions and 
walks of life such as a farmer, a lawyer, a medical practitioner and a pensioner may equally 
be directors without their lack of knowledge of steel which may disqualify them as a result of 
their lack of skill. It is a requirement of directors that they apply the skill and business 
acumen which they do possess to the advantage of the company.”62 From the said analogy it 
is evident that a director need not be a particular professionally skilled person and anyone 
may hold the position as a director, what is important is, in holding such a position the 
director’s conduct themselves with a standard of care and skill reasonably expected. 
In the early centuries in certain instances serious misconduct did not necessarily amount to 
gross misconduct and the common law courts expected gross negligence to be found to hold a 
director liable before a director could be held liable for breach of the duty of care and skill63.  
At common law a director was required, in the performance of his or her duties, to exercise 
the care and skill that may be expected of a person with his or her knowledge and experience. 
In the case of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd 64 the directors were 
unsuccessfully sued for losses as a result of their disastrous business decisions in the rubber 
plantations in Brazil. The directors based their decision to invest in rubber plantations on a 
fraudulent report on rubber plantations. The court held that a director is to act with reasonable 
care, having regard to his knowledge and experience and is not bound to have any special 
qualifications65. It was further held that a director will not be liable for the losses or damages 
caused as a result of mere errors of judgment. 
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In the Re Brazilian Rubber Plantation & Estates Ltd66 case there is regard to a contention of 
these directors being favoured as a result of their inexperience and incompetence. In this case 
it is evident that even though the directors were made aware and were in possession of the 
fraudulent and false reports in respect of the rubber plantation, they still made consequential 
and disastrous decisions which led to damage and loss of the company67. Even though the 
directors of the said company were sued they were held not to be liable, as court stated that 
the duty of a director to exercise care must be one that is reasonably expected of such  a 
director taking into account both that specific directors experience as well as his knowledge68. 
As founded in this case the court was of the view that a director does not need to have any 
special skill, expertise and qualification and he may continue with the management and 
affairs of the company without having any knowledge in respect of what a rubber business 
entails. What is important is that the director is to conduct himself reasonably and rationally 
in good faith for the benefit of the company69. 
Prior to the statutory provisions the duty of care and skill were encapsulated by the principles 
found in the common law. In South Africa the test for negligence was a primarily objective 
one based on the “reasonable person” test, formulated by courts in largely subjective terms, 
which depended on skill, experience and the ability of a particular director 70 . The 
repercussion was that a low threshold standard of care was expected of directors under the 
common law which required a director to only exercise the degree of care and skill that the 
individual director was capable of71. Under the above test formulated a director may have 
even acted with complete contempt and absurd foolishness, yet still not be found liable as a 
result of the director’s incompetence, inexperience and ignorance which protected the 
director from liability72. Directors were expected to only exercise the degree or level of skill 
and care that they were capable of, so the more incompetent and ignorant a director was the 
lower the standard of care which was expected. 
Throughout the common law duty of care and skill the courts were constantly handicapped by 
prescribing a single set of standard for all directors. It is not easy to set such an objective test 
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for directors as there are many circumstances to be considered such as the different types of 
companies, the different roles required from each director, companies further vary in size, 
form and function73. If an objective standard or test was applied after considering the above 
statement then the functioning of a company will be greatly disadvantaged as an objective 
test will lead to unsuccessful results and is not feasible in such a situation where our country 
consists of vast diversity.74 
As explored above it is quite apparent that there are practical difficulties which arise for 
courts or legislature to prescribe a single standard or requisite for directors in respect of 
carrying out their duties of care, skill and diligence. As such, a subjective test is superiorly 
prescribed rather than an objective test due to fact that an appointed director  may not be a 
professional individual and there is no set test according to which the care and skill to which 
a director portrays is to be quantified, therefore there is no objective test which has been laid 
down75.  
Considering the above Williams agrees with the undoubted common law test which places a 
subjectively moderate or lenient burden on directors in the performance of their duties of 
care, skill and diligence while holding such a position76. Williams supports the subjectively 
low test by making the following inferences:- 
1. A director of a company is compared to that of an employee of a company. What is to 
be considered is that a director does not enter into a contract with a company as an 
employee does. Further in respect of an employee the skills, expertise and 
expectations which an employee possesses are known for the performance of his or 
her duties77.  On the other hand the skills and expertise of a director are unknown as 
an employee and director do not have the same obligations; hence such is the result 
for attaching a seemingly lenient burden on directors. 
 
2. The next point focuses on the requisites for a non-executive director compared to that 
of an executive director. An executive director is tasked with the daily dealings 
expected of a director who is continuously involved in the functioning of the 
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company, while non-executive directors are only expected to be present at board 
meetings78. As a result of the different expectations and obligations required of these 
two directors there is a different standard of care and skill required of these two 
directors.  This point is of irrelevance in the statutory provisions, after the 
introduction of the case of Howard v Herrigal79 which held that it is unhelpful to 
distinguish between executive and non-executive directors as the duties and 
determination of duties refer to all directors. Williams is in support with the argument 
in the said case. 
 
3. Lastly with reference to the case of Dovey v Cory80 the court stated that “the business 
of life could not go on if people could not trust those who are put in a position of trust 
for the express purpose of attending to the details of management”. A similar 
principle was laid down in the case of Fisheries Development Corporation of SA Ltd v 
Jorgensen Ltd81 were the following paragraph was extracted; “in respect of all the 
duties that may properly be left to some official, a director is in the absence of 
grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform such duties honestly 
and is entitled to accept and rely on the judgment, information and advice of the 
manager unless there are proper reasons for querying such.” 
As per the above cases it is evident that directors may delegate certain of their 
functions, duties and tasks to certain officials or employees who are experts in certain 
fields of the company if the director does not have any reason for distrusting or 
doubting such official or employees honesty82.  
Even though the above inferences depict the low standard of care and skill which was 
required of a director in terms of the common law, the statutory provisions of the Companies 
Act 2008 aim to attach a more demanding standard of care and skill than the common law as 
the common law standard of care and skill was subject to wide spread critique by many 
authoritative sources and commentators. 
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In the case of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd83which was discussed supra, 
the principle exposed in this case is that a director’s duty of care and skill is to act with the 
level of care that is reasonably expected of that particular director, which is based upon his 
own knowledge and experience. Under this test it is noted that the more experience and 
knowledge a particular director has, the higher the threshold of reasonableness becomes. This 
case is the leading authority based on the facets found in the statutory provisions. 
The most salient decision which forms the common law development of the duty of care and 
skill is founded in the case of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd84which confirmed the 
subjective test laid down in the case of Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd85. 
These cases will be dealt with in detail in the following chapter below. 
The decisions made by a director and their duties, even though are distinct from each other 
are at the same time complementary in nature, an inference of this can be drawn if a director 
fails to monitor the company affairs and decides to carry out his duties with complete 
disregard and incompetence, then consequently such a director would have breached his duty 
of care, skill and diligence and ultimately have incurred delictual liability. 86 A similar 
inference is drawn where a director appoints an unskilled, inexperienced and fraudulent 
person to carry out the duties of the company in a situation where the director is temporarily 
unavailable or away from the company. Such conduct will definitely amount to an abuse of 
directors’ powers and duties of care, skill and diligence and tantamount to negligence or 
breach of directors’ duties.87  
With reference to the above statements, Cassim infers that while directors are in the 
performance of their duties, should such duties be conducted with negligence, carelessness or 
incompetence, the director will be liable to the company as a consequence of their negligent 
conduct and will further be liable for any loss or damage which may have resulted due to 
their negligent and careless conduct88. 
Despite the prevalent differentiation existent from the common law to the Companies Act 
2008, the one principle which remains constant through the time line of  South African 
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Commercial law is that it is not a requirement for a director to have any special qualification, 
skill, expertise or business acumen in the performance of holding a position as director and 
such requirements may never be known as each company is unique from one another and the 
directors appointed have their own unique duties which are expected and to be carried out by 
them89. Hence laying a stringent test of what exactly the duties of a director should entail will 
fail hopelessly in our law, considering the diverse nation which we are born from and the 
diverse commercial industry which exists. 
 2.2.2 Moving towards a more stringent hybrid approach as opposed to the common law 
lenient (subjective) approach which existed in the past. 
Notwithstanding the fact that our law is powerless in precisely pointing out the set 
requirements which are expected of a director in the performance of his or her duties of care, 
skill and diligence and the controversy hovering over this topic, there are many sources 
which attempt in resolving the existent controversy which subsequently resulted in the South 
African Companies Act 2008 following the partial codification approach of the directors’ 
duties of care, skill and diligence. An indication of our law moving away from the lenient 
common law approach, stepping into a more reformed stringent approach is evident from 
sources which will be dealt with in this paragraph.  
The most common source is extracted from our current corporate statute, firstly being that of 
the partially codified section 76 of the Companies Act 71 of 200890.  Section 76 relates to the 
conduct of a company director and that such conduct and performance should ultimately aim 
at influencing the profitability, success and best interests of the company. Secondly section 
43 of the South Africa Close Corporations Act91, which states that a person of a corporation 
is to act with a standard and degree of care and skill that is reasonably expected of a person 
with his knowledge and experience or a person in the same shoes as that director92. Thirdly a 
statute adopting a more rigorous approach is evident from findings of section 60(1) of the 
Banks Act 199093, which state that directors owe the banks a fiduciary duty and the duty of 
care and skill. This section further makes reference to a director possessing expertise, skill 
and knowledge to a person in a similar appointment as him.  
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Fourthly a source to be highlighted in respect of our law adopting a more stringent approach 
is the King Report94 which has provided certain guidelines in which directors should adapt to 
and follow in conducting their duties. An extract from the King Reports states the following:- 
“In line with modern trends worldwide, should not only exhibit the degree of skill and care 
that may be reasonably expected from persons of their skill and experience, but should also 
exercise both the care and skill any reasonable person would be expected to show in looking 
after their own affairs as well as having regard to their actual knowledge and experience; and 
qualify themselves on a continuous basis with sufficient understanding of the company’s 
business and the effects of the economy so as to discharge their duties properly, including 
where necessary rely on expert advice.”95  
Lastly reference should be made to a more recent statute, the Bank Amendment Act 200396, 
section 40 (c) and (d) which shadowed other jurisdictions while incorporating a more 
stringent approach which states that a director should act in a bona fide (good faith) manner 
for the best interest of the company, possess the required knowledge and skill of a prudent 
person and should carry out their duties in a manner in which a reasonable person of a similar 
situation would do so97. 
South African corporate law, in particular the duty of care and skill was heavily reliant on the 
findings of English law and as such our common law was moulded from the findings 
elucidated from the common law of England. The English law thereafter adopted and 
formulated a more rigorous and stringent test to which a director should carry out their duty 
of care and skill.  This test comprised of a dual subjective and objective test which was once 
again followed by South Africa98. 
The first case which took on the stance of adopting a more stringent dual test in English law 
was the case of In Re D’Jan of London Ltd99, a case in which the court correctly stated that 
the test that should be used in respect of quantifying the standard of directors care, skill and 
diligence should include both subjective and objective elements which will confer a more 
rigorous approach. This case changed the ruling from the more lenient subjective approach as 
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evident from the case of In Re Denham & Co100, a case in which a director was taken to court 
for not performing his duties and functions with the requisite care and skill for over a period 
of four years. The court followed the lenient common law approach and found that a director 
will only be liable for breaching his duties of care and skill if he had acted with serious or 
gross negligence and that the director in this matter, even though had not performed his duties 
for four years had not acted with serious or gross negligence and was not found liable.  
A case which is significant to the stringent approach followed by a different jurisdiction is the 
Australian case of Deloitte Haskins & Sells v Anderson 101, where the court stated that it is no 
longer appropriate for the courts to judge directors’ conduct based on the subjective test 
which were applied in outdated precedents. Considering the ruling of the above case it is 
evident that courts are moving away from the lenient subjective approach and are 
incorporating an objective approach which makes the test for measuring directors’ conduct 
much more stringent while increasing liability for breach of directors’ duty to act with the 
expected degree of care and skill. 
Despite the stringent change having been founded in countries such as England and Australia 
which is evident from above, the stringent approach was also followed by jurisdictions like 
the United States and Canada.  In the United States the US Model Corporation Act 1984102, 
conferred an objective standard which is to be followed by the directors of the company. 
Such standard entails looking at the circumstances, nature, extent and responsibilities of the 
duties which are imposed on a particular director. The director is to act with the reasonable 
standard of care and skill which a person of his calibre would reasonably believe is to be 
carried out103 . A similar inference is drawn from the Canada Business Corporation Act 
1985104 which also concurs to the objective standard which is to be used by directors in the 
course and scope of their duties. According to the Business Corporation of Canada a director 
is to carry out their duties and powers in a manner in which a reasonable director who is of a 
similar situation and circumstance would do so105. 
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As discussed above it is safe to say that South Africa has closely followed the findings 
encompassed in the above jurisdiction with an attempt to eradicate the lenient approach of the 
common law which attached very little liability to the negligence of directors which left huge 
craters and scope for unscrupulous conduct. The partial codification of the Companies Act 71 
of 2008 sets a more demanding standard of care and skill which is not limited nor a closed 
list, but rather ensures that a fair and equitable approach is used to assess the standard of a 
director to that of a person who is of a similar calibre in a similar situation106. Our law does 
however slightly differ from other jurisdictions as it follows both, a dual subjective and 
objective test which is appropriate given the diverse commercial standing which exists in our 
country. 
Our law with its stringent approach further aims to incorporate the best practices of corporate 
governance, while focusing on the evolving commercial factors and management of 
companies.107 As a result of the change and focus to which the statutory provisions of the act 
is ultimately aimed at, the common law becomes inadequate and out dated with the modern 
times, however its use and reference is constantly utilised for the benefit of improving our 
statutory findings into improved legislation with a greater impact on the ever changing 
commercial world which we live in. 
2.2.3. A comparison between the common law and statutory law duties. 
Before the initiation of the Companies Act 71 of 2008108 there was no codification which 
occurred in respect of directors’ duty of care, skill and diligence as expressed in the common 
law. South Africa and Australia were both heavily influenced by the finding of English 
precedent from the 18th and 19th century109. It is evident that South Africa did not previously 
incorporate the directors’ duty of care and skill into legislation; however what is to be noted 
is that there are certain statutes which could be seen to have expressed such duties. 
The first notable act in which this is evidently expressed is in section 43 of the Close 
Corporations Act 69 of 1984110. This section makes reference to a director acting with a 
standard and degree of care and skill that is reasonably expected of a prudent person with his 
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knowledge and experience. The second notable act is section 60 of the Banks Act 1990111 
which state that directors owe the banks a fiduciary duty and the duty of care and skill. This 
section further makes reference to a director possessing expertise, skill and knowledge to a 
person in the similar appointment as him. Currently section 76 makes reference to the 
standard by which a director should carry out their duty of care skill and diligence112. A wise 
metaphor used by Du Plessis is that the intention of legislature in quantifying the reasonable 
standard which is expected of a director is to ensure that apples are compared with apples and 
oranges compared with oranges113. 
Prior to the statutory findings the traditional approach was that directors possessed limitless 
powers, however the statutory findings were of the view that the traditional approach 
mirrored outdated practices as we are now exposed to many factors which impacted on 
this114. Some of these factors included our country’s vast exposure to international trade, 
international financial dealings and international corporate management which required that a 
higher standard and degree of care and skill to be implemented and carried out by company 
directors 115 . Even though the common law remains flexible and constantly under 
construction, the current Companies Act 2008 reflects a futuristic approach as compared to 
the traditional common law approach116. 
A traditionalist view of directors’ duties is illustrated in the case of Turquand v Marshall117, 
were it was found that it was within the scope and powers of a director to lend a “brother” 
director a loan, and however foolish this act, might have been, as long as this act was within 
the powers and scope of the director the court could not attach liability nor interfere in this 
instance. Further it was held to be the misfortune of the company and shareholders to have 
appointed such an unwise and foolish director118. It is quite obvious that this lenient approach 
was subject to criticisms and needed extensive construction. A director is to act for the best 
interest of the company and should not act in a way to cause himself or any other person any 
benefit or advantage. The modernistic approach displayed in the statutory provisions aims to 
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eradicate the lenient approach followed by the common law which was infallible and would 
lead to an economic downfall if was still in existence. 
An unchanged common law principle which is still currently applied in our statute is derived 
from the case of Regal Hastings Ltd v Gulliver119, were it was held that a director should not 
abuse his position, obtain personal knowledge of the company for his benefit or for the 
benefit of any other person, neither should a director ever be placed in a position of 
competing with the company for his own interests. What is discernible in this case is that a 
director should act in the best interest of the company and as such this principle is 
incorporated in our statute120. 
A reaffirmation of the findings in statute is found in the case of Greaves v Barnard121, 
whereby the court reasserted that directors owe a fiduciary duty to the company and should 
act in the best interests of the company and lastly acknowledge that the company is the 
ultimate heir of the duties by which a director carries out. As per the findings in this case it is 
of utmost importance that directors acknowledge that their actions are inevitably in the best 
interests of the company as their decisions and conduct consequently could lead to be 
advantageous or disadvantageous to a company at a whole which in adversely results in a 
company’s success or eventual downfall. 
Apart from section 76(3)(c)122 which deals with the statutory duty of care, skill and diligence, 
there are many other statutory provisions which protects a company or restricts directors from 
acting with incompetence  or without due regard for the company 123 . Some of these 
provisions are envisaged in section 77(2)(a) of the Companies Act124which expresses the 
view that a director of a company may be held liable in accordance with the principles of the 
common law should the director not act in the best interest of the company or be in breach of 
their fiduciary duties.  A further  section which is  of importance is that of section 218(2) of 
the Companies Act125 which provides that any person who contravenes any provision of the 
Act is liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered by that person as a result of 
that contravention. 
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The previous approach to liability of a director who breaches his duty of care, skill and 
diligence comprised of many factors126. Firstly it was ultimately the shareholders misfortune 
if they had appointed incompetent and dishonest directors127. Secondly the courts could not 
adjudicate upon the dishonest decisions or conduct of directors as the courts were not aware 
of the circumstances and factors under which the director had made such a decision128.  
Thirdly due to the diversity which is in existence in South Africa and due to the fact that we 
are unable to pin point the exact requirements or standard by which a director is to carry out 
his duties of care, skill and diligence there is no accurate or closed standard, as directors are 
sourced from different backgrounds, skills, knowledge, experience and business acumen129. 
Apart from the statutory provisions which may hold directors accountable for their loss or 
damages, a director may be liable for loss or damage under the common law principles of 
delict130. The statutory provisions further incorporate the idea that the common law must be 
developed with the aim to improve the rights and obligation which were previously laid down 
under the common law131. For a director to avoid such liability it is paramount that the 
director conduct himself or herself with the require degree and standard of care and skill. The 
standard of care and skill to be carried out is not that of a reasonable man test, but rather that 
of what would reasonably be expected from a person with the same skill, knowledge, 
experience and business acumen holding such a position132. 
What is distinct from the above is that there is a reasonable expectation that directors who 
possess the same skill, knowledge, experience and business acumen which is similar to that 
of another director should be compared to each other. The standard of care and skill will not 
be measured objectively. The courts will have to determine the expectations of a director with 
the same functions and comparable traits, and will have to determine how a director with 
similar characteristics and business traits would have conducted himself or herself before 
concluding their decision133. Ultimately the test is a dual subjective and objective test. 
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2.3. CONCLUSION.  
As expressed above it is evident that South Africa originally followed different jurisdictions 
in moulding its law, both the common law and statutory law, however its greatest influence 
stemmed from early centuries of English law. The point to be emphasised is that the common 
law was noted for its controversial issues resulting in the statutory provisions which 
reconstructed the traditional approaches used under the common law into a futuristic 
approach which is in line with current commercial factors.  
Under the Companies Act 2008, directors as prescribed offices of the company are expected 
to conduct themselves in the performance of their duties for the best interest of the company 
in the most economic and profitable way. The statutory provisions which incorporated both a 
subjective and objective approach considered the reality and practical circumstances which 
directors may be faced with and found an approach which will best be suited to match the 
diversity present in all companies. The prescribed offices of a company play the role as 
leaders which inevitably influence their employees which in turn may lead to an increase or 
decrease of profits, take on major decisions on behalf of the company for the best interest of 
the company which in turn impacts on the company in an advantageous or disadvantageous 
way. In a nutshell the decisions which directors take ultimately determine the success or 
downfall of a company. 
A major influence to the statutory developments, even though influenced and rooted by 
international jurisdictions was actually drawn from certain corporate legislature in South 
Africa. Particular reference is made to the Banks Amendment Act 19 of 2003134 and the 
Close Corporation Act 69 of 1984135 . The lenient approach of the past was eventually 
overtaken by a more stringent and rigorous approach which was implemented into the 
statutory law. As a result of this stringent approach there is now a clearer understanding of 
the law, less uncertainty and a wider breath of exposure to flexibility within the diverse 
modernistic commercial field which exists. It can be confidently stated that the provisions 
found in the current partially codified statute is a first for South Africa in terms of following a 
new approach other than the common law and will definitely be the beginning of many 
successful companies and future developments in our company legislature. 
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As a result of the great responsibilities placed on directors which impact not only the 
company and all that it stands for but also the director, the employees and society. The 
statutory provisions aim at providing a practical, clearer and more accessible law and 
guidelines which in turn may aid a director in following the prescribed standard of care and 
skill resulting in a profitable and successful company. 
As a result of the change which occurred, it is safe to say that this change from the common 
law to the statutory law was inevitable; as the business environment which exists in our 
country is dynamic and it is only appropriate that the law is on par with the modernistic 
commercial era we are challenged with. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 A STATUTORY LAW APPROACH TO DIRECTORS’ DUTIES OF CARE AND 
SKILL-Section 76(3)(c) 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
The common law duty of care and skill has stepped its way into statute with particular 
reference to Section 76(3)(c) of the Companies Act.136 This newly founded statute places a 
more onerous and demanding standard of care and skill than that which was traditionally 
expected of in the common law137. The initiation of the statutory duty of care and skill 
mirrors modernised commercial and business factors while incorporating corporate 
governance which will in turn reflect the promotion of the best interests of the company to 
operate in the most profitable and successful manner to include the involvement of 
international trade.138. 
The common law was modified as a result of extensive judicial scrutiny as to what the 
appropriate standard of care, skill and diligence a company director is to carry out. It is to be 
noted that as a result of a director holding such a position the business decisions made will 
inevitably impact on the company’s success and profitability. The extensive scrutiny resulted 
in the introduction of the partial codification which exists in the statutory provisions relating 
to the duty of care, skill and diligence.  
As expressed in the common law chapter above, this chapter will aim to express the changes 
which were brought about as a result of the statutory provisions which incorporate a more 
rigorous standard of care and skill by referring to the relevant and applicable case law, 
legislation, international laws and critique of the partial codification either reflecting an 
advantage or disadvantage to the South African corporate landscape. As introductory insight 
into this chapter it is noteworthy that the test applicable in the statutory provisions of the 
Companies Act 2008 incorporates a dual hybrid, subjective and objective elements which 
form the partial codification. A further reason for the statutory provisions incorporating a 
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dual stance is to improve the common law test and not completely disregard the importance 
and provisions of the traditional common law approach.  
Despite the improvement and advancement postulated in the statutory provisions of the act, 
many commentators once again attack these modernised provisions and place them under 
scrutiny as to whether real success actually lies in these provisions. This controversial issue 
and the application of both the common law and statutory law and its difference between the 
standard of skill and care to be carried out shall be examined in an attempt to seek clarity, 
including the disadvantages and advantages which already hover around our economic 
environment. 
Even though the common law has not been discarded in totality, its use and application is 
minimal as the stringent approach incorporated in our current statute overrides the lenient 
traditional approach which existed in the past, thus attaching greater liability to negligent and 
careless directors who fail to carry out their duties with the required standard of care, skill 
and diligence. 
3.2 THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE DUTY OF CARE AND 
SKILL. 
3.2.1 The hybrid stringent approach and existent partial codification. 
As the common law closely shadowed different jurisdictions in modifying the directors’ 
duties of care and skill, the same approach was incorporated by the South African statute 
wherein the United Kingdom as well as other relevant provisions of South African legislature 
such as the Banks Act139 and Close Corporations Act140 where followed.  As a result of this 
the Companies Act 2008 was introduced to include the codified provisions relating to 
directors duty of care and skill. 
The provisions of section 76(3)(c) of the Act state the following - 
(3) subject to subsections (4) and (5), a director of a company, when acting in that 
capacity, must exercise the powers and perform the functions of director 141 -: 
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(c) with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may be reasonably expected of a 
person142 –  
(i) carrying out the same function in relation to the company as those carried out by 
that director;143 and 
(ii) having the general knowledge, skill and experience of that director.144 
From the above provisions it is quite clear that the statutory duty of care is less subjective and 
more demanding to the provisions in the traditional common law approach. This stringent 
approach incorporated in our statute aims to instil modernised commercial and business 
factors and incorporates the best practices of corporate governance applicable to a director 
which may eventually lead to a more successful and profitable company145. It is noteworthy 
that the statutory approach is partially codified which preserved both subjective and objective 
elements. 
The statutory dual objective and subjective standard is hybrid in nature and is not wholly one 
sided to either being a subjective or objective test. Various factors are considered under the 
application of this test which will augment the minimum objective standard of the common 
law to a higher subjective standard146. These factors include the size of the company, position 
and responsibilities of a director and the nature of the circumstances under which the decision 
was made. The purpose of this incorporation into the test ensures flexibility when there is a 
factual scenario which needs to be determined147. 
The statutory provisions of director’s duty of care, skill and diligence have assimilated a two 
legged test for directors. The first leg of the test is set out in subsection (i) of section 
76(3)(c) 148  which states that all directors carrying out the same function should meet a 
requisite threshold as that director to avoid liability for negligent conduct in the performance 
of their duties 149. This is the objective leg of the test. The second leg of the test is subjective 
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in nature and found in subsection (ii) of section 76(3)(c)150. This leg of the test provides that 
if a director is found to have a higher standard of knowledge, skill and business acumen that 
could be reasonably be expected of a person carrying out the same function in relation to a 
company, then such a director will be liable to a higher standard151. The eventual outcome is 
that the judiciary will have to determine the standard of care, skill, diligence and business 
acumen that is to be reasonably expected of a director who is carrying out the same functions 
of a company as the director in question. Subject to what is expected of the court, the court 
does not stop there.  The court has to go further and determine the degree of care, skill and 
diligence that can be expected from the director in question152. 
The above standard is the statutory test which is used to determine negligence of director’s 
for failure to conduct themselves with the required degree of care, skill and diligence. It is of 
importance to note that this test does not supersede or substitute the common law 
principles153. The common law is still in effect and is used by courts to hold a director liable 
in delict for negligent conduct which results in a company suffering a loss or damage from 
the directors’ failure to conduct themselves with the required standard of care, skill and 
diligence.154 
A movement from the common law lenient approach towards the more stringent statutory 
approach ensures that the more care, skill and knowledge a director possesses, the more 
onerous his duty becomes as he or she would have a higher threshold to meet155. In the same 
way the less care, knowledge and skill a director possesses the less onerous the duty of care, 
skill and diligence is and the less likely a director is to be held liable for negligence. 
According to the provisions of section 76(3)(c) a mandatory duty is owed to the company by 
the directors156. A director is not expected to carry himself with all the required care, skill and 
knowledge, rather what is expected is only the care which may reasonably be expected of that 
individual director as compared to a director carrying out similar functions157. It should be 
noted that a director may not act in a manner which is less than that expected of a reasonable 
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person. This establishes whether a director has breached his duty of care, skill and diligence 
under the statutory provisions158. 
It is apparent that the duty of diligence is not particularly discussed in isolation or made 
reference to. Diligence actually implies that a director is to conduct himself or herself in a 
swift and efficient manner in attending to his or her duties, to be informed about the factual 
scenarios and issues which are affecting the company, and lastly make himself or herself 
aware and knowledgeable of the steps to be taken forthwith from the issues by finding 
solutions in the information which has been supplied to him or her. 
The provisions of section 76(4)(b)159 is relevant to a director conducting himself with the 
required degree of care, skill and diligence. This section accords directors to rely on 
information from a professional body or expert. The reliance of information from such a body 
is accepted if the director reasonably believes that such a person is competent and reliable. 
Should a director accept the information supplied from a person who is not of a competent or 
reliable nature, then the director would not have acted reasonably and thus be liable for 
negligence as a result of breaching his duty of care, skill and diligence160. 
The provisions of the statute aim to promote a higher threshold of transparency, corporate 
governance and standards of accountability for directors which are in accordance with the 
international best practice. A director in performing his duties acts as an agent of the 
company who is assigned with the responsibility of promoting and protecting the company’s 
best interests161. A case in which a director had breached his duty and acted for his own 
interest rather than for the best interest of the company, was the case of Da Silva v CH 
Chemicals (Pty) Ltd162,  which was dealt with in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The main 
factor of this case put simply was that the director had furthered his own interests to the 
detriment of the company. The court held that a director owes his duties to the company to 
the exclusion of the company's shareholders and all third parties. If it is found that the 
conduct of the director was not to further the interests of the company, a director renders 
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himself liable to being in breach of his duties as a result of his negligence and ulterior 
motive163. 
A case comprising of similar principles and importance, which had gradually moulded the 
principle that a director has a mandatory duty to exercise care, skill and diligence, was 
highlighted in the case of Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited164, where the 
court found that a director would be negligent even though that director was entrusted with 
the responsibility of acting honestly. The court held that a director should exercise such a 
degree of skill and diligence as would amount to reasonable care which an ordinary man, 
having that particular director’s knowledge and skills, may be expected to take in the same 
circumstances165. 
The principle distilled from this case is that in respect of the subjective test, a director will not 
be liable for mere errors of judgment. He is not required to demonstrate expertise which he 
does not have in the performance of his duties, and is parallel to the objective test, in that the 
director is not expected to have any knowledge or to exercise skills which he does not 
possess 166 . In managing the company’s affairs diligently, the director is accordingly 
commended with the responsibility of devoting a reasonable amount of attention to the 
company’s affairs. Failure to demonstrate proper diligence may result in liability of a director 
who has acted negligently, fraudulently, dishonestly or with disregard and incompetence. 
 It is safe to say that the common law principles of South African law has now been expanded 
by the partial codification of the statutory provisions envisaged in section 76(3)(c) of the 
Companies Act 2008167 , which strikes a balance between the required standard of care, skill 
and diligence which was initially founded under the common law, currently very much alive 
in the statutory provisions which have not discarded the common law in totality but rather 
modified the traditional founded principles. Bearing this in mind the principles of good 
corporate governance which aim to promote and protect the best interest of the company have 
been initiated and included into our newly founded statute. 
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3.2.2 Application of the newly founded stringent approach 
As expressed above, we are aware that the statutory provisions of the Act provides for a two 
legged test for a director to conduct himself with the required care, skill and diligence. The 
first leg of the test is set out in subsection (i) of section 76(3)(c)168 which states that all 
directors carrying out the same function should meet a requisite threshold as a director of 
similar functions and performance to avoid liability for negligent conduct in carrying out 
their duties of care, skill and diligence169. This is the objective leg of the test. The second leg 
of the test is subjective in nature and found in subsection (ii) of section 76(3)(c)170. This leg 
of the test provides that if a director is found to have a higher standard of knowledge, skill 
and business acumen then such a director will be liable to a higher standard171. 
In application of the above test it is noteworthy to differentiate between the use of subsection 
(i) and (ii) of section 76(3)(c). From the wording of the act it is apparent that subsection (i) 
applies to the spectrum all directors, but subsection (ii) applies to those directors who possess 
a higher standard of skill and business acumen. If a director possesses a higher standard of 
skill then both legs of the test will be applied, however if a director does not possess a high 
standard of skill or expertise then the first leg of the test shall only be applied. 
Subject to the above applications it is important to note that the reasonable person test will be 
applied along with the two legged test. The reasonable person test determines the standard of 
care, skill, diligence and business acumen that is to be reasonably expected of a director who 
is carrying out the same functions as the director in question. In the event of a director not 
possessing a high standard of business acumen and skill where he ought to have required a 
higher standard of care and skill as a reasonable director carrying out the same functions as 
the director in question, then that director would be held liable for negligence as he ought to 
have known that a higher degree of care and skill was required in that instance. 
A further reason for the above mentioned test is to eradicate applying a standard single sided 
approach. The test which is found in our current statute, which is referred to the stringent or 
rigorous approach actually accommodates for flexibility as it tends to consider the different 
circumstances and scenarios with which directors are challenged with and that the test should 
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be applied taking into account the facts and challenges that directors are faced with. Bearing 
in mind that a sense of flexibility is visible from the test available to directors, it is not to be 
abused as liability will undoubtedly be attached to those directors who are found to be 
negligent for their failure to conduct themselves with the required degree of care, skill and 
diligence.  
      3.2.3    Benefits and the downfall of the partial codification which exists in our statute. 
Despite the statutory provisions modifying and advancing the traditional principles of the 
common law, despite its modification is entrenched in our statute and its use is thus current 
and applicable. The statutory provisions accordingly place directors in a position whereby 
they are able to identify the scope and standard of their duties more clearly172. It is apparent 
from a survey which was conducted by the UK Institute of Directors’, that a substantially 
high percentage of directors do not even know what the scope of their fiduciary and non-
fiduciary duties entail, to whom such duties are owed and the benefit of their duties and 
performance173. 
Before discussing any benefits of the partial codification it is important to distinguish the 
difference between complete codification and partial codification. Complete codification is 
unchanging, constant, inflexible and does not allow for any change as expressed in findings 
of partial codification174. Partial codification allows for improvement and advancement of the 
common law as this was the introduction of our law in South Africa which shadowed the 
English precedent. The refreshed Companies Act 2008 incorporates partial codification and 
allows for the common law to be constantly modified and improved175. The importance of the 
partial codification is to set out a requisite standard of director’s conduct, limiting their 
powers in the dealings of the company and lastly increasing accountability, transparency, 
profitability and independence176. The act further attaches liability to a director who breaches 
or fails to act with the required standard of care, skill and diligence in the performance of 
their duties. 
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A further benefit born from the statutory provisions is the partial codification which considers 
the principles and benefits of both the common law and statute. The fact that the common law 
principles are preserved with the newly founded statute provides that such provisions co-exist 
for the eventual benefit of all directors.  In South Africa the partial codification of directors’ 
duties followed the trends fashioned in many jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Ghana, Malaysia, Singapore, and the United Kingdom apart from other common-law 
jurisdictions 177 .  As a result of South Africa shadowing these jurisdictions the partial 
codification of the statute will align and accord South Africa with the approaches found in 
different jurisdictions178. 
The Institute of Directors’ in Southern Africa, before the introduction of the new Companies 
Act 2008, created a report known as the King Report on Corporate Governance179 which 
aimed and focussed on the review, improvement and recommendations of corporate 
governance180.  In a nutshell corporate governance is about “effective” leadership including 
the relevant principles and guidelines to which a director should adhere to in the performance 
of his or her duties181. The South African corporate governance regime is a set of principles 
and guidelines founded from the values to which a director should hold. Such values include 
accountability, transparency, honesty, selflessness, fairness and most importantly business 
ethics and values 182 . In the case of South African Broadcasting Corporation Ltd v 
Mpofu183the court emphasised that integrity is vital in effective corporate governance which 
should be based on a code of ethical behaviour and personal integrity which are 
characteristics of which a company director possesses184. It is clearly expressed in this case 
that a director of a company is required to possess a standard of ethics, values and morals of a 
high calibre and it can be inferred that such characteristics shall be evident in the success and 
profitability of a company. Through the time line of South Africa’s corporate statutory 
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modifications, the King report on corporate governance simultaneously underwent many 
changes since its first publication in 1994185. 
As a result of the Companies Act 2008 there was a need for a newly founded King Report on 
corporate governance. The first founded King Report was introduced in 1994, commonly 
known as the King I which focussed on the issues which were predominant around corporate 
governance, which further aimed to create a higher standard of corporate governance in South 
Africa 186 . The King I was thereafter replaced by the King II which required that all 
companies including large entities were to be listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) and were also required to comply with the requirements and expectation of the code. 
Failure in complying with the requirements of the code attached liability to the 
perpetrators187. Lastly the most recent King Report known as the King III was formally 
formed after the Companies Act 2008188, commonly known as King III, which came into 
effect in March 2010.  
The aim of King III is to promote corporate governance and to reinforce responsibility to the 
class of people who partake in the management and functioning of a company and is seen as 
the backbone to corporate governance existent in South Africa incorporating the provisions 
laid down in statute189. The King III was also used as an indicator as to whether a director of 
a company acted with the appropriate standard of care, skill and diligence which ensured 
compliance of the Companies Act 2008190. The Companies Act focussed on the recourse 
available for a company where a director is in breach of his or her duty of care, skill and 
diligence while the King III focussed measuring the appropriate standard of care and skill 
required of a director which was in line with the newly founded statutory provisions191. 
The provisions expressed in the King III Report advocate that a director should act with a 
prescribed set of principles. These principles have four requirements prescribing a director 
to:- 
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1. Act with intellectual honesty and independence of mind in the best interests of the 
company and all its stakeholders, avoiding conflict of interest192;  
2. have the knowledge and skills required for governing a company effectively193; 
3. be diligent in performing their duties and devote sufficient time to the company 
affairs194, and lastly; 
4. have the courage to take the risks associated with directing and controlling a 
successful, sustainable enterprise, and also the courage to act with integrity in all 
board decisions and activities195. 
It is apparent from above that the principles rooted in the King III and that of corporate 
governance endorse the appropriate standard to which directors’ should conduct themselves 
in the performance of their duties. It can be said that the provisions laid down in statute and 
the principles of corporate governance work hand in hand in achieving the same outcome 
which is to ensure the success of the company and the prescribed standard by which directors 
are to conduct themselves for the success and growth of the company196.  
The King code of corporate governance complied with the provisions of legislature to 
provide certainty as to what required standard of care or what required standard of conduct is 
expected from a director in the performance of his duties to ensure that the appropriate 
standard of care, skill and diligence is carried out197. A further apparent analysis is that the 
King III is used as an avid indicator as to whether a director acted with the required care, skill 
and diligence to ensure compliance of their duties while the Companies Act expresses the 
recourse available to a company should director’s be in breach of their duties and be found 
negligent for their conduct and performance198.  
A noteworthy case which of importance in this particular instance is the case of Stilfontein 
Minister of Water Affairs and Forestry v Stilfontein Gold Mining Company Ltd199which 
expressed the view of how our judiciary tests directors’ conduct and performance against the 
King Report considering the relevant provisions of the Companies Act of 2008. Considering 
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the main factors of this case, there are two main issues canvassed to be of a cardinal nature. 
The first is whether the directors of the company had breached their duties owed to the 
company by all resigning simultaneously and secondly the issue of social responsibility and 
to whom directors owe their fiduciary duty and duty of care and skill200. 
With regard to the first issue it was held that the directors had indeed breached their fiduciary 
duties to act selfless for the ultimate benefit and interests of the company. The directors 
abandoned their responsibilities and relinquished their obligations which were due to the 
environment as such directors held positions in a mining company. The court held that the 
directors could not “walk away” from their obligations201. It was found that the directors 
were irresponsible and irrational and had left the company to fend for itself without any 
directions from the directors. The directors paralysed the company by failing to act in its best 
interest as they ought to202. 
 As expressed above it is evident that the application and provisions of both the King Report 
and the Companies Act held the directors accountable and negligent for the loss and damage 
which the company suffered as a result of their failure to carry out their duties with the 
reasonable standard of care and skill203. It is thus indisputable that the Companies Act and the 
King Reports work hand in hand for the benefit of the company and economy, increasing 
productivity and profitability which is a distinct consequence of a successfully managed 
company204.  
Apart from the above, the partial codification prevalent in the current statute has a number of 
benefits. The benefits of partial codification comprise of clearer and more efficient 
guidelines, saving money, time and effort in finding and complying with the law; and 
enabling directors to clearly identify the scope of their duties. The benefits are not a closed 
list and are discussed below in greater detail. The benefits further enable the directors to 
ascertain the standard by which they should conduct themselves for the best interests of the 
company.205 
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Despite the innumerable advantages which were borne alongside the provisions of the new 
Companies Act, there are still disadvantages which hover around this topic. Be that as it may 
many commentators have different opinions concerning the advantages and disadvantages 
with which the partial codification of the newly founded Companies Act carries206. The 
benefits borne of partial codification incorporates the principles of corporate governance 
which mainly focuses on the best interests of a company207. The benefits apart from above 
comprise of the following:- 
 promoting transparency, accountability, independence while considering the best 
principles of corporate governance208, 
 creating awareness to the duties of a director and the standard which is required of 
them209, 
 creating certainty and clarity in the law as the use of the language in the statute is now 
more understandable as well as user friendly210, 
 the number of provisions found in the current Companies Act are reduced and 
supercede those of the old Companies Act211, 
 provides for the initiation of simpler procedures and compliance with the provisions 
of the Act212, 
 considers the evolving modernised corporate terrain as well as the remedies available 
for the challenges a company might face213, 
 creates awareness to prospective directors and the public as to the requirements of the 
duties and characteristics a director should possess214, and; 
  focuses on corporate governance by providing that a director should be selfless with 
its ultimate aim at promoting the company for the best interests of the company 
itself215. 
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Subject to the above advantages of the partial codification, commentator Bouwman concurs 
as per her article216, and infers that there is a perfect balance between the partial codification 
of directors duties of care and skill contrasted between the common law and statute. She 
further concurs with the fact the law is much more easily accessible and certain without 
ambiguity and loopholes which directors or shareholders may find with regard to their duties 
of care and skill and as such the confusion which was predominant in the past has now been 
eradicated.217 
Despite the above benefits concurred by Bouwman herself, there is a contrast of opinion 
which carry heavy critique from commentators such as Bekink218, Havenga219 and Mervin 
King220. To introduce the criticisms of the partial codification emphasis is made on the points 
made by Bekink. Bekinks synopsis considers both the subjective and objective view. He is of 
the opinion that the subjective test comprises of a directors general knowledge, skill, 
experience and business acumen which may conceal the requirements of the objective test. 
As a consequence of this our judiciary may experience uncertainty and ambiguity when 
determining what directors’ duties entail and what duties are reasonably expected of a 
director221. 
 Moving on to Havenga’s notion, she is of the opinion that since this aspect of law is now part 
of statute, people will try to evade the provisions of the statute due to cost implications which 
may be involved. Further the common law has been exposed to many changes, criticisms yet 
has been applied for many years. Her taking expresses the view that the statutory provisions 
are very current and are still subject to many criticisms, will still have to be applied and there 
will still be many challenges and problems which may be experienced in its application222. 
Lastly critique apparent from the notions expressed in King Report II by Mervin King who is 
of the opinion that the provisions of the statute which has codified the common law is still 
subject to many potholes despite the statute being drafted for the best interests of the directors 
and the company.  
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One of the main reasons is that directors are always placed in a situation of pressure in 
conducting themselves with the required degree of care and skill. The stringent approach 
incorporated in statute may instil fear in directors in respect of liability and ultimately may 
not be the best approach as directors are now restricted to the requirements of provisions 
which may restrict the expression of their full potential and capabilities as directors for the 
best interests of the company223.  
3.3. CONCLUSION. 
The construction of the common law traditional approach has evidently led to a more 
stringent and rigorous approach adopted in our statute. This is not to say that the common law 
is now discarded, it is very much still in use and applied. Apart from the modification of the 
common law traditional approach, our statute has incorporated a partial codification towards 
the duties of care and skill which are required of directors. It is safe to say that not much has 
been lost from the common law as the statutory provisions contain components of both the 
subjective and objective tests, while the subjective test was initially evident from the 
traditional approach224. 
One of the most notable changes provided for in the statutory provisions dealing with the 
duty of care, skill and diligence is that of liability. As per the provisions of statute, directors 
are faced with a more onerous duty to ensure the required standard of care and skill is carried 
out in the performance of their duties. Apart from the aspect of liability, the 2008 Act now 
incorporates the provisions of corporate governance which ultimately aim at reaching the best 
interests of the company by considering the many modernised factors which our economic 
environment are challenged with. 
The findings of section 76(3)(c)  provide directors with a sense of direction, in that they are 
now aware of what is expected of them in carrying out their duties of care, skill and 
diligence. Apart from directors, prospective directors, the community and stakeholders now 
have access to the provisions of how directors should conduct themselves selflessly and for 
the best interests of the company. These groups of people are further informed of the liability 
attached to directors who contravene their duties of care and skill and how a director may 
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escape liability by the provisions of the business judgment rule which will be discussed in the 
chapter below. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE - A DIRECTOR’S SANCTUARY FROM 
LIABILITY. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is paramount to understand the reason why South Africa adopted the business judgment 
rule. Before an exposition into the business judgment rule it is important to note that as a 
consequence of our statute adopting a more stringent and rigorous test to which directors’ 
duties of care and skill are to be measured, our statute had to strike a balance between this 
stringent test by easing the burden of liability to those directors who conducted the company 
and its decisions in good faith.  
A company cannot function without human involvement; as such every decision made by a 
director is subject to a rational, reasonable, and informed basis for the best interests of the 
company. The main aim of the business judgment rule is to provide a “safe haven” for 
directors who carried out their duties in a bona fide (good faith) manner even if such 
decisions led to disastrous results225. This does not mean that directors will be protected 
blindly irrespective of their mala fide (bad faith) conduct, this protection is only afforded to 
those directors who honestly, reasonably and rationally believed such decisions would be for 
the best interests of the company226.  
It is significant that the differentiation of negligence and mere errors of judgments are 
expressed herein. In the application of the business judgment rule it is important that the 
decisions or conduct of a director amount to mere errors of judgments or mistakes and not 
negligence227. A director is to carry out the performance of their duties with all the reasonable 
care, skill, diligence and honesty for the best interest of the company. If a director fails to act 
in such a manner such conduct will be tantamount to negligence and the business judgment 
rule cannot be applied to conceal such negligent conduct. 
From the above paragraphs it is evident that the provisions of statute do not imply that 
directors are to conduct themselves with all the possible skill and care in the performance of 
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the duties, what is expected of directors is for them to conduct their duties of care and skill in 
a reasonable manner with a reasonable amount of care and skill. Cassim is correct in his 
contention that humans are infallible and subject to mistakes and errors228, however these 
mistakes and errors should be such that a reasonable director in such a position would have 
possibly made, given the facts and circumstances. Directors will not incur liability for 
mistakes and mere errors provided they exercised the reasonable care and skill necessary, this 
is the curb of liability which the business judgment rule aims to provide229. 
Given the introduction of this chapter with emphasis on the business judgment rule, this 
chapter will focus on the jurisdictions to which South Africa followed in its application of the 
business judgment rule, the current statute and case law applicable to the business judgment 
rule and a thorough exposition to the application of the business judgment rule currently 
applied in South Africa and how it affords protection to directors despite the stringent 
provisions of statute. 
4.2.1 The jurisdiction to which South Africa shadowed in incorporating the business 
judgment rule. 
The business judgment rule has been incorporated into the Companies Act 2008 for the 
purpose of easing the burden of the partially codified duties of care, skill and diligence230. 
The business judgment rule was formally developed by the American judiciary to essentially 
aid as a defence for directors who acted in a bona fide (good faith) and reasonable manner 
when making business decisions for and on behalf of the company which resulted in loss or 
damage to the company231. The aim of the rule was to provide a shield of protection to a 
director who in the performance of his duty of care, skill and diligence made a rational, 
reasonable and informed decision in a manner which he believed was in the best interest of 
the company232. 
The business judgment rule originated in the early 19th century in the state of Delaware in 
America and was used as a tool for judicial review233. It is important to note that in American 
law, similar to South Africa directors owe the company a fiduciary duty to act in the best 
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interests of the company as well as a duty of care and honesty as opposed to the duty of care, 
skill and diligence in South Africa234. The duty of care and loyalty is quantified against an 
ordinary reasonably cautious person, while the duty of loyalty involves the notion that a 
director should not place himself in a situation where there will be a conflict of interest. A 
director is not to make decisions for his or her benefit but rather focus the benefit solely on 
the company. In the performance of their duties a director should and not conduct himself in 
a dishonest, unscrupulous and unfaithful manner235. 
Apart from the above, the law of Delaware states that a director is to act in good faith and 
honesty. The meaning of “good faith” was expressed in the case of In re RJR Nabisco Inc 
Shareholders Litig236, where Chancellor Allen had provided for the meaning of “bad faith” by 
stating, “such limited substantive review as the rule contemplates (i.e. is the judgment under 
review “egregious” or “irrational” or so beyond reason etc) really is a way of inferring bad 
faith”237. The meaning portrayed in this case ultimately links to liability of a director due to 
negligence, should a director make a decision which is irrational, unscrupulous, dishonest and 
completely mala fide (good faith) then such a director will be subject to judicial review were 
the judiciary shall attach liability to the director based on the nature of their negligence and 
the extent of negligence. 
Directors who perform their duties with the reasonable care, loyalty and honesty for the best 
interests of the company, shall be afforded the use and protection of the business judgment 
rule which serves as a defence or shield, should a third party such as shareholders of the 
company infer negligence to the conduct of the directors238 . The rule serves as a “safe 
harbour” for directors who carry out their duties in the above manner even though the 
company suffers damages239. However should a director breach their duty of care or conduct 
themselves in an irrational and selfish manner, then the losses or damages suffered by the 
company can be linked to the unfavourable conduct of the directors who will inevitably be 
found negligent and liable as a result of their conduct. 
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4.2.2 The constitution of the business judgment rule according to the American Judiciary. 
According to the American Law Institute240 and the Delaware law dealing with the business 
judgment rule, there are certain components or elements which need to be fulfilled in order 
for a director to benefit from the protection encapsulated in the business judgment rule. The 
elements which a director needs to partake in to benefit from the shield of protection are as 
follows:- 
 A decision is to be made by the director free from selfish interest and for the best 
interests of the company241; 
 The director is not to be placed in a position which conflicts with his or her interest or 
the interests of the company when making such a decision242; 
 The decision must be made in good faith with honest and profitable intentions for the 
company243, and; 
 The decisions must be taken with reasonable and rational care, considering the 
circumstances of the situation244. 
If a director fulfils the above requirements and did indeed act in good faith, then the business 
judgment rule shall act as armour against directors liability for negligence for the losses and 
damages suffered245. Evidently so, if a director makes a decision irrationally without the 
reasonable care, with selfish intentions or fails to carry out the above elements he or she shall 
justly be found liable for negligence and the business judgment rule will provide no scope for 
protection to the director. 
The introduction of the term “safe- harbour” was formally initiated by the American judiciary 
in the American Law Institute246. The term “safe-harbour” entrenched the above elements in 
its application and ultimately provide directors with an antidote free from liability subject to 
the fulfilment of the above elements247.  
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Apart from the “safe-harbour” term, the Delaware law provided a further benefit to directors 
based on that of presumption. The findings on the use of presumption was held in the case of 
Aronson v Lewis248, thereafter concurred in the case of Warshaw v Calhoun 249  were it was 
held that “there is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of the 
corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action 
or decision taken was in the best interest of the corporation”. 
 It is apparent from the wording of the above case that the courts will presumably believe that 
a director of a company acted in good faith, made a rational and reasonable decision, made 
the decision for the best interest of the company and took the appropriate steps of care and 
skill in making the decision. Subject to a third party such as a shareholder or an interested 
party of the company contesting that the decisions were made in good faith, for the best 
interest of the company, or that the director failed to carry out the required care and skill then 
the third party shall have to prove to the court that the director did in fact act in mala fide 
(good faith) manner.   
The third party or any other interested party of the company is to show the court negligence 
on part of the director by proving to the court that the decision made by the director was so 
irrational and unreasonable that a director with his skill, qualifications, experience, business 
acumen and expertise would have considered various factors and information before making 
the decision and would not have arrived at the same decision250. Should the third party be 
unsuccessful in proving to the judiciary on a balance of probabilities that the director failed to 
act with the required care and skill, then the director shall get the benefit of the doubt and 
thus avoid any liability for negligence. 
It is a pre-requisite of the business judgment rule that the decisions made by the director shall 
be made reasonably and rationally in good faith for the best interests of the company and to 
avoid decisions that are considered to be made in bad faith251. In the American case of 
Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers & Co (Maidenland) Ltd252,the court had correctly decided that if 
a director fails to make a decision with the reasonable and rational care and skill then the 
decision made shall convey characteristics of bad faith. 
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A noteworthy case which moulded the South African business judgment rule which was 
formally decided by the Delaware law in America is the case of Smith v Gorkum 253, a case 
which was taken  on appeal by the shareholders of the company in finding the directors’ 
liable for negligence in respect of their decision to sell the shares of the company without any 
due regard to the price of the shares which were to be sold. The court a quo (court of first 
appearance) had incorrectly found that the directors may escape liability by the use of the 
business judgment rule. On appeal the court disagreed and reversed the decision initially 
made by the court a quo (court of first appearance) for the following reasons:- 
 The directors failed to inform themselves of the value of the shares of the company to 
the value of the sale of each share254; 
 The board did not make an informed and rational decision in respect of the sale of the 
shares as this decision was done within a short period of time without considering any 
expert reports or expert advice; 
 The shares were not correctly valued by independent experts and the board 
irrationally accepted the  recommendations of the senior management of the company 
who are not qualified to value such shares255, and; 
 The board failed to examine the agreement to the sale of the shares, failed to look at 
the profit which the company may make and most importantly failed to consider the 
losses and damages that the company could suffer256 
This case is of cardinal importance as evidently shows that the directors of the company 
failed to conduct themselves with the required standard of care, skill and diligence which was 
expected of a director. Even though the facts of the case did not have any relation to self 
interests or fraud on part of the directors, the decisions made by the directors were so 
unreasonable and irrational that the company had suffered grave losses. The appeal court 
correctly decided that the application of the business judgment rule shall not be used in a 
situation where the directors failed to make a decision rationally, reasonably, in good faith 
with sound reasons. The directors in this case failed to take the appropriate steps in making a 
sound business decision which lead to the destruction of the company and their liability for 
negligence. 
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4.3 THE INTRODUCTION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN SOUTH 
AFRICA. 
The business judgment rule has been a controversial issue in South Africa which began from 
the mid 1990’s.  The controversy lingers around the aspect of whether it was a bright idea for 
South Africa to follow the initial business judgment rule formulated by the American law257. 
The main aim of South African law incorporating the business judgment rule is to shield 
those directors who carry out their duties in good faith and honesty from liability for 
negligent conduct. Bearing in mind the aim of the business judgment rule, it is evidently true 
that should a director conduct himself in good faith with the required degree of care and skill, 
yet still cause a loss or damage to the company as a result of his or her decision he or she 
shall be subject to the protection of the business judgment rule as a result of acting in good 
faith and honesty with the required degree of care and skill258.  
Since the introduction of the King Report on Corporate Governance259 in 1994 there has been 
a need for the Companies Act to be amended to include certain limitations which will aim to 
protect or encourage directors who conduct themselves in good faith to seek entrepreneurial 
opportunities, take risks, agree to the position of being director and to be innovative for the 
benefit of the company260. 
In respect of the most recent King Report on corporate governance, known as the King 
Report III which was formed after the Companies Act 2008, despite the Report not being 
legislation it is guidelines which work hand in hand with legislation and the Act 261 . 
According to King III there are guidelines laid forth for directors in the performance of their 
duties such as to act with honesty and independence for the best interests of the company, to 
avoid any situation which may lead to a conflict of interest, to have a standard of care, skill 
and diligence required for effectively performing for the company, and to encourage risk 
taking and entrepreneurial activities which will ultimately lead to a successful and profitable 
company262. Should a director conduct himself or herself in such a manner and make a 
decision which leads to a business error or mistake even though might be disastrous will be 
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absolved from liability by the use of the business judgment rule. These principles will thus 
have to be considered by the judiciary who will have the final say as to whether the director is 
to be found liable for his or her negligence or whether the use and application of the business 
judgment rule can be used as protection by the director to exonerate him or her from 
liability263.  
With regard to South Africa adopting the American common law approach, particular 
emphasis should be placed on the case of Foss v Harbottle264 which incorporated principles 
from the American law. The relevance of the findings by the judiciary was of cardinal 
importance as there are certain requirements which a director needs to fulfil in order to 
qualify for the protection which the business judgment rule affords. The court further held 
that the decision made by the director is to be made in good faith, with the required degree of 
care, skill and diligence for the best interest of the company265. The (4) requirements which a 
director should observe are as follows:- 
1. The decision considered and made by the director should be a business related 
matter266;  
2. The decision made by the director should have no gain for the director neither shall 
the director be in any position to benefit from the decision, the decision is to be made 
for the sole and best interests of the company267; 
3. In the decision making process an appropriate level of care, skill, diligence and 
expertise is to be portrayed268,and; 
4. The director is to act in good faith269. 
As a consequence of the findings in the above case, it is apparent that the requirements from 
this case are similar to the requirements of the American based business judgment rule which 
require that the directors are to perform or conduct themselves in a similar manner. Given the 
findings of the American legislation which has been in application for almost 160 years270, it 
is safe to say that as a result of the successful application and use of the business judgment 
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rule in America, that South Africa modelled its taking on the business judgment rule and 
followed similar footsteps as America in introducing the business judgment rule in the 2008 
Companies Act271.  
4.4  CODIFICATION OF THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE- S76(4) OF THE 
COMPANIES ACT 2008. 
The business judgment rule under the 2008 Act was introduced as an attempt to lighten the 
liability which flows from the stringent and rigorous test applied to directors carrying out 
their duties of care, skill and diligence272. 
The provisions of section 76 (4)273 of the Companies Act is expressed as follows - “In respect 
of any particular matter arising in the exercise of powers or the performance of functions of a 
director, a particular director of a company – 
(a) will have satisfied the obligations of subsections (3) (b) and (c) if - 
   i) the director has taken reasonably diligent steps to become informed about the matter; 
   ii) either – 
 aa) the director had no material personal financial interest in the subject matter of the 
decision, and  had no reasonable basis to know that any related person had a personal 
financial interest in the matter; or 
bb) the director complied with the requirements of section 75 with respect to any 
interest contemplated in subparagraph (aa); and 
  iii) the director made a decision, or supported the decision of a committee or the board, with 
regard to that      matter, and the director had a rational basis for believing, and did believe, 
that the decision was in the best interest of the company; and 
b) is entitled to rely on – 
i) the performance of any persons – 
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aa) referred to in subsection (5); or 
bb) to whom the board may reasonably have delegated, formally or informally by 
course of conduct, the authority or duty to perform one or more of the board’s 
functions that are delegable under applicable law; and 
ii) any information, opinions, recommendations, reports or statements, including financial 
statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by any of the persons specified in 
subsection (5)”. 
The aim of the business judgment rule is to encourage risk taking, innovation and 
entrepreneurial activities by shielding directors from liability for negligence were directors 
make an informed rational and reasonable business decision in good faith274. It is safe to say 
that the business judgment rule prevents the courts from interfering in a situation where a 
director has made a business decision in honesty and good faith despite the consequence of 
the business decision275. 
In the case of In re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited 276 and Fisheries 
Development Corporation of SA Ltd v Jorgenson277, both cases dealing with the similar 
common law principles which stated that a director shall be liable in the performance of their 
duties of care, skill and diligence if they fail to conduct themselves with the required degree 
of care and skill which would be reasonably expected of a person with that particular 
directors knowledge and experience. The provisions of statute express the view that each case 
will have to be determined in isolation, considering the fact that each company and the 
directors of the company hold different functions, obligations and responsibilities and are 
involved in conducting different business initiatives 278 . If the situation is such that the 
director fails to carry himself out in a rational and reasonable manner as that of a similar 
director then the director shall be liable for the loss or damage which the company may 
suffer279. 
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Our statutory business judgment rule has shadowed the rule which has been in application in 
the American judiciary for 160 over years280. Despite following the American footsteps, 
section 76(4) of the 2008 Act has initiated a partly subjective and objective test. In 
application the objective test is measured against the reasonable man, which requires a 
director to carry out the required degree of care, skill and diligence which is reasonable 
expected of a director carrying out the same functions as that director281. The subjective test 
is thereafter quantified by considering the knowledge, skill and experience of that particular 
director. If the director has a higher degree of skill, knowledge or experience then that 
director will be measured against a higher standard as opposed to a director who has a lower 
degree of skill, knowledge and experience282. 
A synopsis of the statutory business judgment rule is broken down as follows:- 
1. The decision which is made by the director must be an informed and knowledgeable 
one where the director has become aware of all the facts, circumstances, advantages 
and disadvantages attached to the particular decisions283; 
 
2. Secondly the director must have no interest in the decision which is made, there must 
be no beneficial gain whatsoever whereby the director or a third party has benefited at 
the cost of the company. The cardinal rule is that the director is to conduct himself in 
such a manner which results in the best interests of the company284, and ; 
 
3. Lastly the director must have had a rational belief, and actually did believe that the 
decision which he made was ultimately in the best interest of the company285. 
Considering the above pointers, it is of paramount importance to note that should a director 
fulfil these requirements then such a director shall be protected by the use of the statutory 
provisions relating to the business judgment rule. In essence the business judgment rule is a 
sanctuary of protection afforded to directors who are honest, trustworthy and who conduct 
themselves in good faith with the required degree of care, skill and diligence. In the 
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application of the business judgment rule, the judiciary and courts shall not interfere in 
reviewing or judging the business decisions of the director if such decisions were actually 
rational, reasonable and in accordance with the act286. 
Despite the beneficial protection which is afforded by the business judgment rule there are 
many authors such as Bouwman, Botha, Jooste, Havenga, McLennan, Coetzee and Muswaka 
who abhorred and disfavour the provisions of the business judgment rule in the 2008 Act287. 
With the critique on the business judgment rule, Bouwman states as follows:-“ In a society 
where corporate scandals are not few; where competent directors are highly sought after; 
where our courts usually have afforded (and will continue to afford) directors the benefit of 
the doubt; where court decisions show that South African society does not have a history of 
succeeding against directors due to breach of their duty of care and skill; and where the 1973 
Act currently contains, and the 2008 Act proposes, equivalent provisions to provide defences 
for directors against liability, it hardly makes sense to extract a principle (that has the effect 
of providing an extra defence to directors against being found in breach of their duty of care) 
in isolation from a legal system that does not much resemble ours and to incorporate such a 
principle into South African company law288.” 
With particular reference, Bouwman’s scorned view disfavours South Africa shadowing the 
American judiciary as she is of the opinion that we have very different legal systems, 
therefore, the success of the American based rule shall not in any way depict the success of 
the rule implemented in the 2008 Act as both these judiciaries have vast differences in respect 
on the law of directors and are in no way similar289. Further she is of the view that there was 
no need to implement an “extra” defence as the law clearly provided directors who acted in 
good faith with the opportunity of proving their innocence without the use of the business 
judgment rule. 
Notwithstanding the above, the King III taking on the business judgment rule hovers around 
the dark cloud of critique which Bouwman concurs with. The King III report states that “the 
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2008 Act has introduced a new defence for the advantage of directors who are purportedly in 
breach of their duty of care and skill”.290 
The findings of the King III convey the despair that the business judgment rule implements. 
According to the report’s statement I am of the opinion that the reports taking on the  
business judgment rule is seen as a tool in cushioning dishonest directors from liability which 
is to be attached to the perpetrators’ of the law.  
According to McLennan, the notion on directors duties are that the fiduciary duties and the 
duties of care, skill and diligence are to be examined in isolation. McLennan’s view on the 
business judgment rule is that the rule “muddles” the aspect as to what the salient duties of 
directors consist of, as a result of this vagueness, unnecessary uncertainty and confusion is 
promoted291 
4.5 CONCLUSION. 
It is evident that the business judgment rule has been a controversial issue since its 
implementation in the Companies Act 2008.  Davis’s wise explanation regarding the aim of 
the business judgment rule is revealed as follows: “The 2008 Act promotes the objective that 
there should not be an over-regulation of company business. The Act grants directors the 
legal authority to run companies as they deem fit, provided that they act within the legislative 
framework. In other words, the Act tries to ensure that it is the board of directors, duly 
appointed, who run the business rather than regulators and judges, who are never best placed 
to balance the interests of shareholders, the firm and the larger society within the context of 
running a business”292. 
The above extract aims to concur with the application of the business judgment rule in South 
Africa in providing directors with the opportunity to be innovative, take-risks, make large 
entrepreneurial decisions and remove the daunting fear that may always linger on their minds 
as to the liability of their business decisions. Provided a director fulfils all of his duties and 
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obligations in a reasonable and rational manner with the expected degree of care and skill a 
director will be afforded the protection envisaged in the business judgment rule293. 
Even though the origin, purpose and application of the business judgment rule of the 
American judiciary is expressed and understood the critique, both for and against the 
introduction of the rule into the South African Companies Act is currently at a constant 
upheaval. The cardinal criticism against the business judgment rule is that South Africa has 
followed the footsteps of a country which has no similarities whatsoever to that of South 
Africa, despite this factor was still implemented into our statute. With regard to those 
commentators who favour the use and application of the business judgment rule it is apparent 
that the business judgment rule will protect directors who act in good faith with the expected 
degree of care, skill an diligence from the errors of judgment and mistakes despite such 
decisions causing substantial loss or damage. As a cardinal point the rule as explained above 
grants directors the opportunity to make risky decisions subject to the decisions being 
reasonable, rational and an informed one. Notwithstanding the above, since the initiation of 
the stringent and rigorous test which is applied against directors’ duties of care, skill and 
diligence in the performance of their duties, the business judgment rule is used as a tool to 
soften the burden placed on these directors who may be subjected to a higher amount of 
responsibility and power if incorrectly used leading to a greater amount of liability for 
negligence294. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE CONCLUSION 
Peeking into the expositions on the above chapters, it is apparent that a standard can be set in 
respect of directors and that standard is the critical role in which they play. A director of a 
company is as crucial as a heart in a human body, without a director the company will not 
function as a body without a heart. In portraying these vital characteristics it is imperative 
that directors convey positive leadership skills which in turn results in increased productivity, 
a greater turnover of income, radiant employees, content customers and lastly as a result of 
the success of the company a social and environmental responsibility is borne wherein the 
company is in a position to give back to the society and environment as a whole.  
Directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence are unique in nature and directors who manage a 
company on a high management level portray benefits by strongly rooting a successful and 
profitable company. As a result of the partial codification introduced in the Companies Act 
2008, it is imperative to note that the legislature intended to promote a sense of conscience 
and ethical values on all directors and prospective directors to ensure they conduct 
themselves in such a manner which is beneficial for the company in the most profitable and 
successful way possible. 
Recapping on the common law’s taking on directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence it is 
evident from the above chapters that the traditional view has been a controversial in nature, 
mainly in respect of the issue of liability. The traditional lenient approach conveyed in the 
principles of the common law needed to be reconstructed due to the vagueness and 
uncertainty which hovered around this area. As a result this lenient traditional approach was 
reconstructed by the partial codification existent in the 2008 Companies Act which seeks to 
provide a dual hybrid subjective and objective test in attaching liability to directors. As a 
result of the partial codification the uncertainty of directors’ duties, nature and extent of their 
duties as well as liability for breach of their duties were addressed. 
Since the introduction of common law from the late 1800’s, South Africa’s stance on 
commercial law has always followed the principles laid down in foreign jurisdictions. This 
shadow process resulted from the application and success evident in the foreign jurisdictions 
such as England, Canada, Australia and the United States. Incorporating the principles of 
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foreign jurisdictions it is safe to say that the provisions of the Companies Act 2008 followed 
their stance in incorporating so to say a more “stringent” and “rigorous” approach. 
This “stringent” and “rigorous” approach in respect of directors duties of care, skill and 
diligence are encompassed in the provisions of section 76(3)(c)295. It is noteworthy to point 
out that despite the modification of the provisions founded in the common law; the common 
law has not been discarded in the statutory provisions, rather the statute has modified 
directors’ duties of care, skill and diligence by adopting a more taxing and burdensome 
approach. This taxing approach comprises of a mandatory two legged test which roots 
subjective and objective elements. As per the provisions encapsulated in this section, 
directors of a company are to be tested against this standard. From the wording of 
section76(3)(c) it is apparent that subsection (i) applies to the spectrum all directors, but 
subsection (ii) applies to those directors who possess a higher standard of skill and business 
acumen. If a director possesses a higher standard of skill then both legs of the test will be 
applied, however if a director does not possess a high standard of skill or expertise then the 
first leg of the test shall only be applied. 
From the above synopsis it can be seen that the statute provides a stricter test and as such 
favoured as opposed to the common law.  Despite the critique which is inevitable to any 
subject, I concur with the view of Bouwman296 that the provisions of the statute promoting 
transparency, accountability, independence while considering the best principles of corporate 
governance, creates awareness to the duties of a director and the standard which is required of 
them and creates certainty and clarity in the law as the use of the language in the statute is 
now more understandable.  
The duty of care, skill and diligence works hand in hand with the provisions of section 76(4) 
which comprises of the business judgment rule which places a limit or restriction on how 
directors may curb out their liability as a result of carrying out their duties in good faith 
despite concluding with disastrous results. 
The crux of the business judgment rule is to provide directors as well as the judiciary with a 
set of guidelines comprising of a test of reasonability and rationality when attaching liability 
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to directors’ conduct of care, skill and diligence. As expressed in chapter 4, it is evident that 
the South African based business judgment rule followed the steps of the American judiciary. 
Simply, the aim of the business judgment rule is to provide a director who makes an error of 
judgment in good faith, or has carried out his duties in good faith with the expected standard 
of care and skill from liability. It has been emphasised by a large number of authorities that 
the statutory business judgment rule should not have been incorporated in South Africa. 
Despite the critique the business judgment rule is applied to protect honest directors from 
liability subject to the fulfilment of the requirements in place for the business judgment rule 
to be applied. The requirements strongly expects a decision to be made, the decisions to be 
made without any self dealings to the director or a third party and ultimately for the best 
interest of the company, and that there must be a rational and reasonable basis for believing 
that the decisions made by the director was for the best interest of the company. 
As a result of the stricter test laid down in the provisions of section 76(3)(c), the business 
judgment rule aims to lighten the burden placed on directors subject to them acting with the 
expected degree of care, skill and diligence. 
Despite the heavy critique borne through the incorporation of the business judgment rule in 
statute, its success in application is not reliant on the success of American based business 
judgment rule but rather on the application and use in South Africa which has an economic 
terrain completely different from that of  the United States. Its success or downfall shall only 
be known through continuous application and the results which flow from the application of 
the rule.  
The incorporation of the statutory business judgment rule is subject to heavy construction due 
to the negative commentaries of many authors which the rule carries. Notwithstanding the 
critique, the eventual success or downfall is dependent on its application and the success 
which applying the rule might bring. As such the success or downfall of the business 
judgment rule shall only be known with time, due to its introduction in the recent Companies 
Act 2008. 
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